China
Party above state, parallel to state, enmeshed in every level of state. Under Xi Jinping, the idea of China converging toward liberal systems is "thoroughly dismantled"—Beijing presents party-state capitalism as a superior governance model. But the biological parallel isn't a beehive with a queen. It's a slime mold.
Slime molds oscillate between distributed individual cells and unified organism behavior depending on conditions. China's governance does the same through niche-construction: Special Economic Zones like Shenzhen experimented with market liberalization while the Party retained apical-dominance over strategic decisions. Local governments competed for growth; the center maintained control over who won.
This creates path-dependence with explosive phase-transitions. The collapse of Evergrande and the broader property sector crisis revealed how local government land sale dependency created systemic fragility despite central oversight. Private enterprises generate approximately 80% of urban employment, yet state-owned enterprises control the "commanding heights"—strategic sectors where the party maintains direct control regardless of efficiency.
The positive-feedback-loops are intentional. The "Two Establishes" and "Two Upholds" consolidated power under Xi's leadership after the 2018 term limit removal. Error correction now depends on one person's judgment rather than institutional checks. The ant-colony can mobilize extraordinary collective action—zero-COVID demonstrated that—but individual variation is constrained.
The founder-effects of Mao's revolution still shape the system. The Great Leap Forward (1958-62) killed 30-45 million through central planning without feedback. The 2020-23 COVID response showed policy persistence despite changing conditions. When information suppression degrades error correction, the slime mold loses the distributed intelligence that made it adaptive. China's 14th Five-Year Plan runs through 2025; the 15th will test whether the organism can sense and respond to demographic collapse, property crisis, and technological competition simultaneously.
Private enterprises generate approximately 80% of urban employment in China, yet state-owned enterprises control the 'commanding heights' - strategic sectors where the party maintains direct control regardless of efficiency considerations.
Key Facts
Power Dynamics
National People's Congress nominally supreme; President/General Secretary leads party and state
Politburo Standing Committee makes key decisions; provincial party secretaries control local implementation; Xi's personal authority supersedes institutional constraints since 2018 term limit removal
- Politburo Standing Committee consensus (formally)
- Military Commission control
- Propaganda Department narrative management
- But: Xi has consolidated to reduce these constraints
- PLA (ultimate loyalty to party, not state)
- SOE leaders (party members in parallel hierarchy)
- Provincial party secretaries (implementation capacity)
- Tech giants (regulated dependencies)
Failure Modes of China
- Great Leap Forward (1958-62) - central planning without feedback killed 30-45 million
- 1989 Tiananmen - system rejected political reform option
- 2020-23 Zero-COVID - policy persistence despite changing conditions
- Local government land sale dependency creating property bubble
- Demographic collapse from one-child policy legacy
- Information suppression degrading error correction
- Xi dependency creating succession uncertainty
Major policy error (Taiwan, economic crisis, pandemic response) with no mechanism for correction short of leadership crisis
Biological Parallel
Can oscillate between distributed individual behavior (local experimentation in SEZs) and unified organism action (national mobilization). Demonstrates remarkable collective intelligence in some conditions, but individual cells have no independent existence. Efficiency in resource allocation; fragility in novel environments.
Key Agencies
Central bank
Competition and market regulation