Tachira

Táchira State functions as Venezuela's primary interface with the functioning Colombian economy—a border zone where 85% of the country's land-based commerce historically flowed, and where 76% of Venezuela's 5.6 million emigrants (3.9 million people) crossed into Colombia. This concentration creates a unique economy where Colombian pesos serve as functional currency and Venezuelan bolivars are essentially rejected.

The San Cristóbal-Cúcuta corridor demonstrates how border economies can invert normal state relationships. Transportation, goods, and services are priced in pesos; Colombian debit cards are accepted everywhere while Venezuelan cards are not. Smuggling of subsidized fuel became so normalized that customs officials acknowledge: "People don't see contraband as a crime, they see it as a way of life." An estimated underground economy involving powerful mafias, armed groups, and thousands of ordinary citizens made arbitrage the primary employment option.

The 2015-2019 border closure following diplomatic crises created forced separation of this integrated economy. Families were divided; commerce halted officially while smuggling intensified. The human costs included violence, displacement, and the collapse of legitimate businesses that depended on cross-border trade.

The 2024 reopening of the Tienditas bridge (Atanasio Girardot International Bridge) represents attempted normalization after years of tension. Early reports indicate relief and optimism among border communities. However, the Venezuelan government faces a challenge: legitimate trade risks bankrupting Venezuelan producers, especially small farmers (campesinos), who cannot compete with Colombian prices.

By 2026, Táchira's trajectory involves testing whether formalized trade can provide sustainable livelihoods or whether the informal economy's structures—built over decades—simply absorb new crossing points into existing smuggling networks. IOM's assistance to 72,389 migrants between 2024-March 2025 indicates continued outflow.