Chechnya

Chechnya represents an extreme case of subsidy-dependent symbiosis—a region that openly acknowledges survival impossible without its federal host. Ramzan Kadyrov himself has stated: "We won't survive without Russia... I swear to the almighty Allah, we won't be able to last three months—not even a month." Russian subsidies comprise 87% of the Chechen annual budget, totaling 125.6 billion rubles ($1.6 billion) in 2020 alone. This is not economic integration but metabolic dependency.

Post-war reconstruction channeled $7.8 billion (464 billion rubles) into the republic between 2002 and 2012, rebuilding central Grozny into a modern city of glass towers and massive mosques. Yet by 2011, only 6-7% of the prewar economy had actually been restored. Unemployment officially exceeds 60%—probably much higher in reality. The reconstruction rebuilt infrastructure without reviving production, creating what observers call "a unique combination of large-scale federal subsidies and a quasi-feudal system of internal resource distribution."

Chechnya has been exempt from the budget cuts that affected other Russian regions. While the Kremlin reduced transfers elsewhere in response to sanctions and low oil prices, Chechen funding continued undiminished—reflecting Kadyrov's unique political value as a guarantor of regional stability and contributor of military forces. The emerging dynastic succession (son Akhmat heading security at 16, daughter Aishat as Deputy Prime Minister in 2023) represents a path dependence in governance: the costs of replacing the Kadyrov system may exceed the costs of sustaining it indefinitely. Like a brood parasite that the host cannot reject, the relationship persists because alternatives look worse.