International Court of Justice

The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, settling disputes between states and issuing advisory opinions. Only 73 of 193 UN members (38%) accept its 'compulsory' jurisdiction—which is formally called 'optional compulsory jurisdiction,' a contradiction embedded in 1922 Brazilian compromise.

The ICJ demonstrates the pattern of sensory organ without motor control: it can detect and diagnose problems with great sophistication, but has zero ability to enforce. The Security Council, which could enforce under Article 94(2), has never once used this power in 80 years.

Underappreciated Fact

Compliance with ICJ judgments has DECLINED from 80% (1946-1987) to 60% (1987-2004), yet the Court is still perceived as fulfilling its role. The Security Council has NEVER ONCE used its Article 94(2) enforcement power in nearly 80 years. The US withdrew from compulsory jurisdiction in 1986 after losing Nicaragua v. United States—ironic since the US had championed compulsory jurisdiction at the 1899 and 1907 Hague Peace Conferences. Only 201 cases total have been filed since 1946 (~2.5 cases/year).

Key Facts

The Hague

Headquarters

Power Dynamics

Formal Power

Legally binding judgments under Article 94 of UN Charter. Principal judicial organ of the UN with jurisdiction over inter-state disputes and authority for advisory opinions

Actual Power

Only has jurisdiction based on consent—states must opt in. Even with jurisdiction, no enforcement mechanism. P5 members can veto Security Council enforcement of judgments against themselves or allies. Only ONE state has ever asked the Security Council to enforce an ICJ judgment, and the Council did nothing. US vetoed enforcement of Nicaragua judgment (October 1986). Nicaragua remains uncompensated

Veto Points

P5 veto on Security Council enforcement
Voluntary jurisdiction—states can decline or attach reservations
Withdrawal from jurisdiction at any time
Non-appearance—states can refuse to participate
Jurisdictional objections can dismiss cases before merits

Key Relationships

Security Council P5 (sole enforcement mechanism)
General Assembly (requests advisory opinions)
State parties (compliance is voluntary)
ICJ judges (elected by GA and SC simultaneously)

Revenue Structure

International Court of Justice Revenue Sources

UN Regular Budget 100% →

US contributes 22% of ICJ budget; China 15.254%

Key Vulnerability

Cannot be directly defunded through targeted withholding—financial attacks diluted across entire UN budget. But also has no independent revenue or reserves. Judges earn $191,263 base salary (2023) plus post adjustment, with $25,000 special allowance for President—modest compared to other international courts

Comparison

Unlike national supreme courts, ICJ has no power to appropriate funds. ICC judges earn €180,000 net; ECHR budget €88.5M funded by Council of Europe member contributions

Decision Dynamics at International Court of Justice

Typical Decision Cycle Years to over a decade for contentious cases on merits

Fast Slow

Fastest

Ukraine v. Russia provisional measures: 18 days (2022)—'lightning speed' for international courts. Advisory opinions average 51 days

Slowest

Bosnia v. Serbia genocide case: nearly 14 years (March 1993 filing → February 2007 judgment). Only one judge from 1993 provisional measures remained for final judgment

Key Bottleneck

Jurisdictional challenges (respondents routinely file preliminary objections), notice-and-comment procedures, political stalling (no penalty for delay), lack of enforcement creates no urgency

Failure Modes of International Court of Justice

Historical

South West Africa Cases (1966): accepted jurisdiction in 1962, reversed and dismissed in 1966 without addressing apartheid—catastrophic credibility loss
Nicaragua v. United States (1986): US lost, refused to comply, vetoed enforcement, withdrew from jurisdiction, never paid reparations
Nuclear Tests Cases: France refused to appear, withdrew from jurisdiction
Compliance decline: 80% → 60% full compliance, 25% drop in effectiveness

Structural Weaknesses

No separation of powers—P5 can veto enforcement against themselves
Only 38% of states accept 'compulsory' jurisdiction
Self-judging reservations—states can exclude matters 'as understood by' themselves
Advisory opinions non-binding yet Court has never declined a request in 80 years

Crisis Scenario

If P5 members systematically ignore rulings (already happening), Court loses relevance and becomes forum only for weak states. Alternative mechanisms (arbitration, regional courts) increasingly preferred by major powers. Advisory opinions weaponized as political tools rather than neutral legal guidance

Biological Parallel

Behaves Like Sensory organ without motor neurons—can detect and diagnose problems but has zero ability to enforce action

Like olfactory neurons that detect fire but cannot make legs run, ICJ can 'smell' violations of international law, diagnose their nature with sophistication, and announce the correct remedy—but must rely entirely on other systems (Security Council, voluntary compliance) to act on its signals. Those systems can simply ignore signals with impunity. The declining compliance rate (80% → 60%) shows desensitization in action—states habituating to ignore ICJ rulings. The Court remains prestigious and functional but increasingly advisory rather than authoritative—a consultant rather than a commander.

Key Mechanisms:

signaling without enforcementreputation based cooperationhabituation to ignored signals

Key Agencies

Court (15 judges)

9-year terms, staggered; hears contentious cases between states

Registry

Administrative organ; manages filings and procedures

Advisory function

Issues non-binding opinions on legal questions from UN organs