Tit-for-Tat
A simple strategy for repeated interactions: cooperate on the first move, then copy whatever the other player did on their previous move. Punishes defection but forgives when cooperation resumes.
Used in the Books
This term appears in 3 chapters:
"...for 40+ years because future gains (+3 × 1,000 interactions = +3,000) exceed immediate betrayal (+5). Time horizon determines coalition success. ::: Tit-for-tat strategy emerges: Cooperate initially, then mirror partner's last move. If they cooperated, cooperate."
"Cheaters get ostracized. No one donates to them. On their next hunting failure, they starve. This is tit-for-tat: cooperate with cooperators, punish cheaters. The strategy, formally analyzed by Robert Axelrod and William Hamilton in their influential 1981 paper ..."
"...ting instead on value-added services (fraud detection, data analytics, tokenization). Co-evolutionary dynamics: Visa and Mastercard engage in tit-for-tat co-evolution (reciprocal feature matching) rather than arms race escalation: - Product innovation: When Visa introduces a feature (e.g., conta..."
Biological Context
Tit-for-tat emerged as the winning strategy in Axelrod's computer tournaments of the Prisoner's Dilemma. It explains how cooperation can evolve among unrelated individuals: be nice first, retaliate against defection, but forgive and return to cooperation. Many animal interactions resemble tit-for-tat.
Business Application
Tit-for-tat principles apply to business relationships: start cooperative, respond to bad behavior with consequences, but remain willing to rebuild trust. Reputation systems formalize tit-for-tat dynamics.