Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E)

PG&E's 2019 bankruptcy—its second, following 2001's California energy crisis—demonstrated how infrastructure companies can be destroyed by liabilities they created decades earlier. The company faced $30 billion in wildfire damages from equipment that ignited fires in 2017-2018, including the Camp Fire that killed 85 people and destroyed the town of Paradise. PG&E's infrastructure had been deteriorating for years while the company paid dividends and executive compensation. The mechanism failure was deferred maintenance creating accumulated liability. PG&E operated 125,000 miles of power lines through areas increasingly prone to wildfire. The equipment was aging; vegetation management was inadequate; inspections were insufficient. Each year of deferred maintenance added to the probability of catastrophic failure, but the costs were externalized until ignition. This is technical debt in physical infrastructure—obligations that compound until they come due all at once. PG&E's repeated bankruptcy demonstrated that even monopoly utilities can destroy shareholder value through operational failure. The company's stock lost 80% of its value; bondholders faced significant losses; customers faced rate increases to fund safety improvements. The California state government considered taking over the utility, demonstrating how corporate failure can force government intervention when the organism provides essential services. PG&E emerged from bankruptcy with new governance requirements and a fire victim trust, but the underlying infrastructure problems remain. Climate change is making California fire risk worse, suggesting PG&E's liability exposure continues to grow.