MoviePass

MoviePass's 2019 collapse demonstrated that subsidized unit economics can create rapid growth that accelerates death rather than preventing it. The company offered unlimited movie tickets for $9.95 per month—far below the cost of even a single ticket in most markets. Predictably, customers signed up; equally predictably, the company bled money on every transaction. MoviePass was paying full price for tickets its subscribers used, creating negative unit economics that worsened with scale. The mechanism failure was confusing user growth with business viability. MoviePass acquired 3 million subscribers in months, achieving growth metrics that would impress any venture capitalist. But each subscriber cost the company money—the more successful MoviePass became at acquiring customers, the faster it died. This is anti-fitness through growth: the organism becomes weaker as it gets larger. MoviePass's strategy assumed it could eventually monetize user data or negotiate discounts from theater chains. Neither materialized. Theaters had no incentive to discount—MoviePass was already paying full price and driving attendance. Data monetization couldn't generate enough revenue to offset losses. The company tried price increases, blackouts, and surge pricing, but each change drove away the subscribers it had attracted through unsustainable pricing. Parent company Helios and Matheson's stock fell from $32 to under a penny. The business model that made MoviePass famous ensured its destruction.