General Motors (2009)

General Motors' 2009 bankruptcy was the fourth-largest in U.S. history at $89 billion in assets, forcing government intervention to preserve a company that had been America's largest for decades. GM's collapse wasn't sudden—it was a 30-year decline that illustrates how organizations can be killed by their own success. GM's success in the 1950s-1970s created the structures that would eventually destroy it. Labor agreements negotiated during boom times created pension and healthcare obligations that cost $1,600 per vehicle more than Toyota paid. This is legacy cost accumulation—past success creating present burdens that future operations must service. GM was building cars to pay for cars already built and employees already retired. The company's mechanism failure was path dependence in product development. GM knew small, fuel-efficient cars were the future but couldn't stop making profitable trucks and SUVs. When gas prices spiked in 2008, GM had no competitive small car response while Toyota and Honda dominated. This is the biological equivalent of an organism that cannot change its diet when food sources shift—metabolic rigidity in a changing environment. The government bailout was justified by trophic cascade prevention. GM's failure would have destroyed suppliers serving multiple automakers, dealers in every community, and pension obligations affecting millions of retirees. GM emerged from bankruptcy smaller, having shed Pontiac, Saturn, Hummer, and Saab brands—forced autophagy that should have happened voluntarily years earlier.