COMAC

COMAC's C919 program reveals the immense metabolic cost of challenging entrenched duopolies in capital-intensive industries. The company delivered 13 aircraft in 2024 (versus original 75-unit target), expects 18-25 in 2025 (slashed from 100), and projects slow ramp to 100 annually by 2026-2027 only if supply chain constraints lift. As of December 2024, all 16 operational C919s carried 1+ million revenue passengers—proof of technical viability. The bottleneck isn't design; it's production ecosystem. COMAC depends on CFM International (GE-Safran joint venture) LEAP-1C engines, faced US export ban suspensions, regained access July 2025 but remains strategically vulnerable. This is niche construction against hostile incumbents: every component requires либerated supply chains Boeing-Airbus control.

The certification barrier illustrates regulatory path-dependence. C919 has Chinese certification, flies domestically, achieved first flight outside mainland China (Shanghai to Hong Kong, January 2025)—but lacks FAA/EASA approval, locking it out of 80% of global market until 2028-2029 at earliest. Boeing and Airbus spent decades establishing certification reciprocity, safety standards, maintenance networks, pilot training infrastructure. COMAC must build parallel systems or remain confined to Chinese airspace and politically aligned nations. The biology: when existing organisms occupy a niche completely, new entrants either find microsites incumbents missed or accept perpetual marginalization.

The strategic threat to Boeing-Airbus manifests slowly but inevitably. COMAC operates with state backing (unlimited patient capital), domestic captive market (1.4 billion people, fastest-growing aviation sector globally), and improving technology (Chinese airlines report satisfactory C919 performance). The company plans 150 annual deliveries by 2027-2028, 200 by 2029—ramping production while Boeing faces 737 MAX certification delays and Airbus hits capacity constraints. Even 10% Chinese market share costs incumbents billions in foregone revenue. The duopoly now faces classic ecological pressure: external threat forcing innovation or resource diversion to competitive defense. Whether COMAC fully succeeds matters less than the permanent pressure it creates, raising Boeing-Airbus costs and limiting pricing power in Asia's growth markets.