Citation
Mate selection - a selection for a handicap
TL;DR
Costly signals are honest signals
The foundational paper introducing the handicap principle - the idea that signals remain honest when they are costly to produce in ways that only high-quality signalers can afford. This revolutionized understanding of animal communication and has direct applications to organizational signaling and credibility.
Key Findings from Zahavi (1975)
- Costly signals are honest signals
- The expense of the signal is the proof of quality
- Low-quality individuals cannot afford to fake high-quality signals
- Signals are reliable because they're costly to produce
- A signal that anyone can fake carries no information
- Only genuinely fit individuals can afford handicapping displays
- The costliness itself makes the signal honest
Used in 2 chapters
See how this research informs the book's frameworks:
Foundational paper introducing handicap principle - signals remain honest when costly to produce in ways only high-quality signalers can afford.
See honest signaling theory →Revolutionized understanding of costly signaling - expensive traits persist because only high-quality individuals can afford them.
See costly signaling dynamics →