Aircraft Accident Report: United Airlines Flight 173, DC-8-61, Portland, Oregon
Copilot knew they were running out of fuel but didn't communicate clearly—10 died, and this case launched the CRM training revolution.
The copilot knew they were running out of fuel. He didn't say it clearly enough. On December 28, 1978, United Airlines Flight 173 crashed into suburban Portland after running out of fuel while the captain fixated on a landing gear malfunction. Ten people died because the cockpit hierarchy made it culturally difficult for junior crew to forcefully communicate critical information to the captain.
This investigation became the genesis for Crew Resource Management—the training revolution that gave copilots explicit permission to challenge captains. The NTSB found that crew members made "several comments regarding fuel state" but "did not express direct concern regarding the amount of time remaining to total fuel exhaustion." For organizations, this is the canonical case of fatal deference: junior team members who see the danger but communicate it obliquely, assuming the leader must know. The fix isn't better individual judgment—it's building communication protocols that make critical concerns impossible to miss.
Key Findings from Board (1979)
- Captain became fixated on landing gear problem while fuel depleted—classic attention tunneling
- Crew made comments about fuel but failed to communicate criticality—deference to authority proved fatal
- 10 killed, 23 injured when aircraft ran out of fuel 6 miles from airport
- NTSB recommended training addressing 'flight deck resource management'—creating CRM movement
- United Airlines launched industry's first CRM program in 1980 as direct response