Biological signals as handicaps
TL;DR
Mathematical proof that costly signals remain honest because cheating becomes prohibitively expensive for low-quality signalers.
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Provides the mathematical formalization of Zahavi's handicap principle, demonstrating rigorously that costly signals can be evolutionarily stable honest communication systems. Essential for understanding the game-theoretic foundations of signaling.
Key Findings from Grafen (1990)
- First rigorous mathematical proof that handicap signaling is evolutionarily stable
- Honest signaling requires differential costs—signal must be relatively cheaper for high-quality signalers
- Equilibrium conditions parallel Spence's 1973 job market signaling model exactly
- Cost-quality correlation necessary: peacock with better genes bears lower marginal cost for same display
- Dishonesty fails not because impossible but because prohibitively expensive for low-quality cheaters
- Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology, volume 144, pages 517-546