AICPA
AICPA is the national professional organization for CPAs in the United States, representing ~431,000 members (66% of licensed CPAs). Unlike ABA or AMA, AICPA lost its core authority post-Enron: PCAOB now controls public company audit standards, FASB controls accounting standards.
AICPA demonstrates what happens when a professional association loses regulatory authority but tries to maintain relevance through remaining infrastructure.
AICPA's authority was gutted post-Enron: lost public company audit standards to PCAOB (2002), accounting standards to FASB (1973). The 150-hour education requirement AICPA championed caused 33% decline in CPA exam candidates (15% overall, 26% among minorities). Ohio, Virginia, Minnesota now ignoring AICPA's 150-hour rule with alternative pathways. AICPA advocacy increasingly mirrors Big 4 interests—organization becoming 'amplifier of large-firm lobbying' rather than independent professional voice.
Key Facts
Power Dynamics
Sets audit standards for private companies; co-develops CPA exam with NASBA; publishes Code of Professional Conduct
Diminished. PCAOB supersedes on public companies. State boards can diverge from AICPA guidance. Big 4 fund opposition to PCAOB metrics rules through AICPA. No equivalent to AMA's CPT code lock-in
- State boards control licensing (not AICPA)
- NASBA shares exam authority
- PCAOB controls public company standards
- Big 4 (aligned interests on regulation)
- PCAOB (adversarial; AICPA lost authority to them)
- State boards (can ignore AICPA)
- NASBA (equal partner on exam/standards)
Revenue Structure
AICPA Revenue Sources
- Membership dues 40% ↓
- CPA exam fees 25% ↓
- CPE and education 25% →
- Conferences and publications 10% →
430K→415K→431K volatility
Candidates down 33% since 2016; shared with NASBA
No mandatory infrastructure monopoly like AMA. Standards free online (not proprietary). State boards increasingly diverge. Exam revenue declining with candidate pipeline crisis
Unlike AMA (CPT codes essential), AICPA's infrastructure is advisory. States can substitute. 'Aspiring parasite that failed to complete the transformation'
Decision Dynamics at AICPA
Post-Enron SAS 99 (fraud focus): ~18 months response to crisis
150-hour rule reversal: 36+ years from proposal (1988) to de facto rollback (2024) after pipeline crisis
State board coordination required; NASBA consensus needed; Big 4 influence on policy positions
Failure Modes of AICPA
- Arthur Andersen/Enron (2001-02): AICPA standards failed to prevent fraud; lost public company authority to PCAOB
- 150-hour rule self-inflicted wound: 33% decline in candidates
- Post-2002 loss of accounting standards authority to FASB
- No infrastructure lock-in (standards free online)
- State boards can diverge
- Big 4 capture of advocacy
- PCAOB supersedes on high-value market
If states broadly adopt alternative audit standards or PCAOB extends authority to private companies, AICPA loses remaining niche. Already competing with Big 4 internal training for member loyalty
Biological Parallel
AICPA was apex predator (controlled all audit standards 1939-2002), now hunting smaller prey (private companies). Tried to inject infrastructure lock-in (150-hour rule) but host organisms (state boards) rejected it. Unlike AMA which found CPT codes to replace membership power, AICPA's infrastructure is advisory and free. The 66% membership coverage provides legitimacy, but declining candidate pipeline suggests profession is shrinking faster than AICPA can adapt.
Key Agencies
Sets audit standards for private companies only (lost public company authority to PCAOB 2002)
Co-develops CPA exam, Uniform Accountancy Act
Enforces Code of Professional Conduct jointly with state societies